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INTRODUCTION 
For thousands of years the controversy has raged 
as to the question, what is knowledge? If viewed in a 
very broad perspective, one might even claim that this 
type of quest pre-dates historical records; after all, 
the Eastern minds have asked what is enlightenment, and 
how is it acheived (certainly quests related to ours in 
spirit if not in exact meaning), for countless centuries. 
Nonetheless, questions concerning the nature and meaning 
of knowledge within a western philosophical context date 
back at least as far as Plato, ŸĦHĚhis Theatetus. 
Since that time many philosophers have endeavoured 
to define knowledge in many different ways. However, the 
one definition which has been, and continues to be, the 
most influential states that knowledge is justified true 
belief. Put according to its epistemological conditions: 
(JTB) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
S knows that P if and only if, 
P is true (or, it is true that p), 
S believes that P, (and) 
S has complete justification for "p". 
Of course, "s" stands for any human subject Whatsoever, 
and tip" stands for any proposition (or any assertive sen-
tence in a particular language) whatsoever. 
As we have stated, this particular defintion of 
knowledge was, to our knowledge, first suggested by Plato. 
Plato himself rejected it as Circular, and since that time 
philosophers in legions have taken at least a few shots at 
it as well. Considering its long and somewhat controversial 
history, many philosophers consider it somewhat surprising 
that it has endured for such a long period of time. But 
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endured it has, and many other philosophers point to its 
longevity as a sign of its enduring and universal truth. 
As one might well guess, conditions (a) and (c) 
have traditionally represented prime targets for the de-
tractors of this definition. Condition (c) has been 
attacked because of the difficulty involved in deciding just 
what represents justification. When do we say S has pro-
per justification? What evidence does he need? If one 
holds that justification must provide certainty, then one 
is apt to be lead to skepticism since propositions which 
admit of any certainty are very, very few in number. Like-
wise, condition (a) has also come under fire. Of course, 
it seems perfectly obvious that in order for S to know that 
P, P must be true, but the possibility of knowing ŸĚP 
is true, that is, the possibility of verifying P, introduces 
another matter. 
Oddly enough, condition (b) has not come under 
too much fire -- until recently. Of late many highly respec-
table philosophers have attacked (b). When stated singu-
larly, that is, without its two companion conditions, (b) 
reads as follows: 
If S knows that P, then S believes that P. 
For the sake of clarity we must also add the stipulation 
of time. Let "T" represent any specific time, or period 
of time. 
(ET) If S knows that P at T, then S believes that 
P at T. 
We have labeled this statement (ET) because it has been 
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referred to as the entailment thesis. 
Our paper is an attempt to refute the entailment 
thesis. We shall consider a number of alternative attacks 
and defenses. AS we have stated, most of the work which 
has to do with the entailment thesis has been done quite 
recently, most in the last quarter-century. Thus, our 
topic lacks the luxury of a historical perspective. It 
does, however, contain the freshness of current thought. 
In a sense, our topic partially represents the state of 
philosophy, and particulary epistemology, at this pOint in 
time. 
Before passing on to a discussion of the argu-
ments and evidence for and against the entailment thesis, 
we are advised to consider one further matter. Wbat does 
it mean to say that S knows that P, or S believes that P? 
After all, how are we to decide whether one implies the 
other or not unless we know what we are talking about in 
the first place? 
Of course, the definition of knowledge which we 
intend to examine states that knowledge is justified true 
belief (JTB). Hence, it must be from this pOSition that 
we go forward. One way of looking at it is to allow (JTB) 
to represent a hypothesis which bears examination. As 
such, one might in turn think of our paper as an examina-
tion of one of its conditions. 
As regards belief, we wish to keep the term itself 
from becoming the subject of our thesis so that we might 
be able to actually examine the issue of whether or not the 
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entailment thesis as a whole obtains. For this reason, we 
shall not endeavour to introduce a pile of other terms such 
as opinion, conviction, assurity, or faith. We shall in-
stead define belief very weakly, When we say that S be-
lieves that P, we merely mean to refer to a cognitive state 
in which S holds that P. Whether or not SiS belief is a 
conviction or merely an opinion, then, will be of no sig-
nificance to us. 
We are now ready to begin. Whether or not the 
reader finds our case against the entailment thesis per-
suasive, a careful evaluation of the evidence is nonethe-
less in order. Much of the information herein comes as a 
result of research, but parts, especially section 4 and 
8-10, are original thought. Thus, it is most likely upon 
these sections that our thesis stands or falls. 
Robert K. Stanley 
SECTION'1 
The question of whether or not knowledge implies 
belief can, of course, be viewed in one of two ways, for 
either it does or it does not. The thesis we defend here 
is that knowledge does not imply belief, and it is our in-
tention to begin by examining the ways in which it has been 
held that one can know what one does not believe. 
On one hand we have a view which states that know-
ing and believing are mutually exclusive acts, which is to 
say that if S knows that P, then S cannot possibly believe 
that P, and if S believes that P, then S does not know that 
P. The arguments supporting this view are somewhat di-
verse. We shall examine two such arguments, one holding 
that the processes of knowing and believing are mutually ex-
clusive, and the other contending that the incompatibility 
is due to impossibility in knowing and believing one and 
the same object. 
The second approach, and one which has been more 
successfully argued of late, is often characterized as a 
somewhat "weaker" or less ambitious pOSition, if you will. 
Rather than contend that knowledge and belief are exclu-
sive terms, many present-day epistemologists have come to 
hold the view that knowledge does not necessarily imply 
belief. In other words, S's knowing that P does not ne-
cessarily imply that S believes that P. While they are 
willing to admit that in many, perhaps even most, cases 
that an individual may have knowledge of, and simultane-
ously believe that P, they point to certain examples, or 
cases, where it is plausible to ascribe knowledge of P to 
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to S, where S might lack any particular belief about P 
either pro or con. 
The first view which has been briefly outlined 
above, states that knowing and believing exclude each other, 
or that if S believes that P, then S cannot know that P. 
Also, if S knows that P, then S cannot believe that P. 
What we have described here, then, constitutes a set of 
necessary conditions. Believing necessarily excludes know-
ing, and knowing necessarily excludes believing as well. 
Furthermore, there is at least one sense in which a con-
dition of sufficiency is involved; for SiS believing that 
P is sufficient grounds for concluding that S does B21 know 
that P. 
One type of example which is used to further the 
above view concerns VWŸWŤÜŤŪWVĚ such as, "Mr. Carter be-
lieves that he is President." and "I believe that I am a 
stUdent at Ball State. tf ØUŸĚdifficulty arises in the irony 
of these statements, after all, one might quite normally 
think that Mr. Carter would be prepared to testify to his 
knowledge of his occupational status, and that I would be 
equally as qualified to know where I study. Why, then, the 
statement of belief rather than one of knowledge? 
Jonathon Harrison suggests that statements such as 
the ones before us are misleading in terms of the impres-
sion which the speaker gives the listener. 1 By stating 
1Jonathon Harrison, "Does Knowing Imply Believing?", 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.13, No.53 (October 1963) 322-32. 
I1s believes that P", where P represents some propostion 
which the listener would deem clearly evident, the spea-
ker thus creates an impression that the subject, a, does B2i 
know that P, but merely believes it. 
Of course, in certain cases such deception is in-
tentional, but in others the difficulty is a matter of 
faulty communication, language being the vehicle for com-
munication in this instance. Where there is no corrupt in-
tent, though, the matter can be quite easily put to rest 
by a simple clarification of terms. Suppose the speaker 
says, "J).lr. Carter believes that he is President." In 
such a case the listener might respond, "But does he ŸĤ
1Z believe it, or does he know it as well?11 If, as the 
nature of the example suggests, Mr. Carter is in a posi-
tion to know that he is President, and the speaker is like-
wise in a position to know that Mr. Carter knows that he is 
President, then the answer must be t1::at he does know it as 
well. (However, should either Mr. Oarter or the speaker 
fail to be in a position of possible knowledge, the mat-
ter must remain unresolved. This does not mean, then, that 
on this basis one would be able to defend the thEd1e of mu-
tual exclusivity, it merely leaves the matter in question 
due to ignorance of the situation.) 
Another common example ÙŪẂŬŨẂŤŸĚthe statement, 
"I don't believe it, I know it-, or "He doesn't believe 
it, he know. it." Here again the impression of a lack of 
connection between belief and knowledge is created. How-
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ever, this situation also arises due to a lack of commu-
nication and specific language on the speaker's part. As 
Professor Lehrer suggests2 the speaker ought to say, "I 
not only believe it, I know it." Or perhaps, "He not only 
bel1eves it, he knows it." Having then made the language 
more precise, we have likewise exorcised any notion of mu-
tual exclus1vity from the situation as well. 
Another sort of attempt which is made to sever the 
ties between knowledge and belief results from an attempt 
to view knowledge "performat1vely," rather than "descrip-
tively." One of the more famous of such attempts has been 
made by J.L. Austin. 3 At one point Austin- compares "1 
know" with "I promise" in order to point out that each is 
an example on a performative statement. Paraphrasing Aus-
tin's argument, when S says, "I prom1se that P," he not only 
makes a statement of intention, he goes beyond that and in 
fact binds himself and his reputation to the listener in 
an entirely d1fferent manner than had he said, "It is my 
intention that P." Thus, when S says If I promise", he has 
done something, bound himself and his reputation, but S 
has not ŸĚthat he has done it. L1kewise, when S VŠİŸHĚ
2Ke1th Lehrer, Knowledge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1974) 49-52. 
3J.L. Austin "Other Minds", LogiC and Language, 
second series, ĜÍĲĪĲŸĚ 123-58., 
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ttr know that p," S has taken a step in binding himself and 
his reputation in a "new way" distinct from simply being 
sure or even being quite sure. Furthermore, knowing is 
not merely a superior claim than being sure or even being 
quite sure, just as promising is not superior on the same 
scale to intending or even fully intending. For, on these 
respective scales there is nothing superior to being quite 
sure or fully intending. 
What this argument boils down to is that when S 
says, "I know that P," he is not describing his epistemic 
state; rather, he is performing a certain act. Thus, by 
making a statement of knowledge, S does not describe him-
self as being one who believes that P since by doing so he 
fails to describe himself at all. 
There does, however, seem to be a basic flaw to 
Austin's account, or at least to those interpretations of 
it which attempt to deny the entailment thesis. The charge 
is that Austin has created a "false dichotomy." Wh1le it 
may very well be the case that in saying, "I know that P, ff 
S performs some feat, it does not follow that he has not 
described himself as well. 4 Consider an act of ordering 
dinner. S says, "I would like a vegetable, carrots." In 
so doing, S has performed the ritual, or act, of. ordering 
something to eat, and has, moreover, been quite specific 
therein. However, he has at the same time described him-
ŸŤUŲŤŲHĚOpt c1t., p. 53, and R.M. Ch1sholm, Theor: 
of Knowledge, p. 17. 
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self as one who would like to have that particular vegeta-
ble. Thus, it is not warranted to assume that a. statement 
must be either performative or descriptive, but not both. 
Clearly, when 8 says, "I know that p,tf he in turn describes 
himself as one who knows that P. If, then, we can take "8 
knows" to be descriptive, we can hold the entailment the-
sis, that is, given the evidence so far presented. 
Perhaps at this point we should say a few' words 
about pragmatiC theories of knowledge in general, and their 
effect, if any, upon the entailment thesis. Pragmatists 
tend to tie knowledge inseperably to action and evaluation. 
That is, if 8 knows that P, S must act or react l.n some 
manner concerning P, and 8 must synthesize or otherwise e-
valuate at least some aspects or implications of P. In 
other words, 8 does not know that P until 8 is prepared to 
take some sort of stand in respect to p.5 
However, a belief carries no such requirements. 
In merely believing that P, S may never act upon, or eva-
luate any aspect concerning P. In effect, action and. eva-
luation serve to draw a clear line between knowing and be-
lieving -- a distinction that is quite clear to the prag-
matist, and never the twain shall meet. Although I know 
of no specific reference to the following pOSition, it seems 
5For the best eXplanation of pragmatism, see C.I. 
Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, (La 8alle: 
The Open Court Press, 1946). 
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at least conceivable. That is, since there exists such a 
clear and distinct line between knowledge and belief, and 
since a pragmatic view of knowledge need not include a 
belief condition, knowledge need not imply belief. 
Note, though, that even the pragmatist has no rea-
son to claim that knowledge and belief are mutually exclu-
sive. Which is to say, eventhough given this interpreta-
tion of knowing, Sfs knowing that P does not necessarily 
entail that S not believe that P; S could both know and 
believe that P nonetheless. So, in aome sense the pragma-
tist might hold the sort of view that we will be,in discus-
sing in Section 2 -- that S could know that P and not be-
lieve that f due to the possibility of S's having no be-
lief about P whatsoever. Thus, a counter-example to the 
entailment thesis is required, and since this will be the 
task of this paper beginning with Section 2, we shall de-
fer any further discussion on the matter until then. 
Another account of the argument claiming that know-
ledge and belief exclude each other has been offered by 
Zeno Vendler. 6 Vendler's argument, which is perhaps more 
ingenious, and certainly mtre compl1cated than those above, 
stems not from a claim that the processes of knowing and 
believing exclude each other, but from a claim that the 
objects of knowledge and belief, respectively. can never 
6Zeno Vendler, Res Co nitans: an essa in rational 
psychology, (Ith1ca: Oomell Univ. Press, 1972 • 
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be the same. 
Vendler's evidence for the claim that it is im-
possible to know and believe the same thing stems from the 
claim that the that-clause (for instance, S knows that P, 
- -
or S believes that p) which follows "5 knows" can be re-
-
placed by a ŸĤ nominalization whereas such a transforma-
tion from a that-clause following "8 believes" cannot take 
-
place without rendering the sentence unintelligable. For, 
if I know that Tom lied, I know ŸĚhe did, and if I know 
that he went to work, I know where he is. 
An example will clearly indicate Vendler's mean-
ing. If: 
(1 ) S knows that Tom went home, 
then (2) I bow- *.. Tom went. 
But 
(3) S believes that Tom went home, 
and (4) S believes where Tom went, 
are not compatible in the same way since (4) is not a 
grammatical sentence. If a third party were to announce 
any of the first three sentences to us, then we should at 
least have a clear idea as to their meaning, but we would 
find (4) to be un1ntelligable and devoid of any meaning. 
From such cases Vendler concludes that there is a 
marked difference between ŸĤȘŨŠẀVŤVĚwhich follow know(s1 
and those which follow believe(s). The difference, he 
feels, is that ŸĤȘŨŠẀVŤVĚwhich follow know(s) are ob-
jective, while those which follow believe(s) are subjec-
tive. That is to say, if S knows that P, then what S 
!nows is a!!£l; P is a fact. However, if 8 believes that 
P, then what S believes is merely S's belief; P, then is 
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merely some opinion or such, but not a fact. Facts are 
objective, while beliefs, like suspicions, suggestions, 
and op1niGns, are thoroughly subjective. 
The transformation potential of the ŸĤȘŨŠẀVŤĚ
in (1) is much different than that in (3); which is to 
say, (1) has a potential for transformation into a ŸĚ
nominalization which does not exist in (3). Thus, Ven-
dler concludes that owing to this difference, that which 
one knows and that which one believes can never be iden-
tical. In that case we never know and believe the same 
thing. 
If Vendler's argument is sound, then the claim of 
the mutual exclusivity of knowledge and belief, Which we 
found to be unwarranted by virtue of an examination of the 
processes of knowing and believing, will be established 
instead due to necessary differences in their respective 
objects. Of course, no "proof" which uses language as its 
calculus may escape an examination for possible ŠÜŞÙŸWÙŨWŨŸĚ
and this case is much the same. O.R. Jones has wr1tten an 
article which performs the function of just such a detai-
led scrutinization.7 
The best reply to Vendler's example takes the form 
of a counter-example. Vendler has neatly divided object 
clauses into those which are subjective and those which 
are objective. In such a case, how should we consider the 
70•R• Jones, "Can One Ee11eve What One Knows?", 
Phl1osophical Review, LXXXIV, (No.2, 1975) 220.35. 
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following? 
(5) Jones says that it is correct. 
If we follow Vendler's reasoning, the 1S!1-clause in (5) 
must be subjective. Clearly just because Jones says some-
thing does not make it an established (or for that matter, 
unestablished) fact. On the contrary, just as in the case 
of beliefs suspicions, etc., the ŸĤȘŨŠẀVŤĚfollowing 
statements like (5), where S says that P, represents the 
subjective ŸĤȘŨŠẀVŤĦĚ But what of the following? 
(6) Jones says what is correct. 
Here we encounter a grave dil:emna as far as Ven-
dler is concerned. In (5) we have a subjective ŸĤȘŨŠẀVŤĴĚ
however, in (6) we succeeded in forming a !h-nominaliza-
tion of that same clause around the same subject and verb. 
Thus, Vendler's distinction becomes a great deal more am-
biguous than he had originally stated it. As it now stands, 
the ability for transformation from a ŸĤȘŨŠẀVŤĚto a !h-
nominalization cannot remain the sole property of so-cal-
led objective P-clauses (those of the form S verb that p), 
but must in at least this case, and therefore in some 
cases, become a property of so-called subjective P-clauses 
as well. 
Of course, as one might argue in Vendler's de-
fense, the difference between the P-clauses following knows 
and believes stems at least partially from the verbs them-
selves. Thus, using the verb "sees" introduces .a. diffe-
rent object, and has nothing whatsoever to do with the 
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transformation potential of P-clauses which follow tlknows" 
or "believes." However, such an example (argument) is not 
open to Vendler's defense. 
Vendler's entire claim rests on his ability to 
demonstrate a clear distinction between the objects of be-
lief and knowledge in themselves. Should Vendler resort to 
-
the claim that the difference in the verbs of "s knows" and 
"s believes" somehow contributes to the difference in the 
P-clauses, then he has failed to show a difference in the 
P-clauses themselves. Rather, he has succeeded in saying 
that "s knows that p" is different from "s believes that P." 
That much there is no problem with. Clearly there is a dif-
ference, the verb is different in each case. From this po-
sition we contend that Vendler cannot pass through the horns. 
On one hand he must admit that there is no clear distinc-
tion between the transformation potential of "objective" 
and "subjective" P-clauses, and on the other he must admit 
that the difference he pOints out exists due to the type of 
verb used. In the former case, Vendler's case becomes no 
more than an example of an oddity of our language, our re-
luctance to hitch certain P-clauses (specifically ŸĤŪŬÜÙ­
nalizations) to certain verbs. In the latter, Vendler 
makes camp with those who argue that the processes of knowing 
and believing, exemplified by the verb in each case, ex-
clude each other. Such arguments fail, of course, for 
reasons Sighted earlier. 
Finally, consider the following. 
Ũ ŸŨĚio) 
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S knows that Jones said that P. 
S knows what Jones said. 
S believes that Jones said P. 
S believes what Jones said. 
Here we have an example of the type of transformation Ven-
dler thought impossible. Of course, (10) does not follow 
from (9), but that does not really matter. The important 
thing to note is that just as the transformation from (7) to 
(8) was possible without rendering the sentence meaningless, 
so was just such a transformation form (9) to (10) possible. 
This possibility is all that is required to show that Vendler's 
grammatical distinction does not reflect a logically neces-
sary difference- in the respective objects of knowledge and 
belief. 
On this account we reject the necessity of diffe-
rent objects in each case. As it so happens, we who speak 
the English language are not "in the habit of" making the 
transformation the same way with one verb (knows) as with 
another (believes). But should this discount the possibi-
lity of knowing and believing one and the same object? Fur-
thermore, since the possibility of such a transformation 
does exist, only a slight modification in syntax would serve 
to abolish any suoh claim altogether. 
.-
SECTION 2 
Thus far we have examined the claim that belief and 
knowledge are mutually exclusive; that is to say, the pos-
sibility of knowing P excludes the possibility of believing 
P as well, and visa versa. There is no doubt that the two 
types of arguments, exclusion by process and exclusion by ob-
ject, have been ingeniously and painstakingly arrived at. 
What is more, the way in which our language is employed seems 
to lend weight to these claims. However, we have found that 
the arguments against the claims of the exclusivists have 
succeeded admirably in showing the "evidence" presented to 
be no more than the trappings of linguistic confusion. 
Jonathoa Harrison, among others, in arguing for the 
entailment thesis, felt that only two possibilities existed 
as to the selection of a solution. The first alternative 
consisted of the acceptance of the entailment thesis, and 
the second of the doctrine of mutual exclusion. Therefore, 
he concluded that by refuting the exclusivists, he had lo-
gically affirmed the entailment thesis. 1 If this were the 
case, our task would be quite finished. 
However, such is not the case. Rather, such a view 
1s a brilliant example of an either/or fallacy; for there 
does exist a third alternative. Most of the remainder of 
this paper will deal with that third alternative. In order 
to specify its goals and claims, let us compare its logical 
structure with those of both the entailment thesis and the 
1Harrison, 2£. £11., p.322. 
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exclusion thesis. 
If we let "Kif stand for "S knows that P at Ttf and 
"B" stand for tfS believes that P at T", the entailment the-
sis is exemplified by the following structure: 
(a) (K>-B). 
However, the exclusion thesis reads as follows: 
(b) (K>.B). ( B>-K ). 
Although (a) and (b) are generally thought to be incompa-
tible, that is, contrary to one another, notice that there 
is no way (deductively) of deriving the contradiction of (a) 
from (b), nor visa versa. As we have seen, then, the estab-
lishment of (b) in order to counter (a) has proven unfruit-
ful. It is for this ŲŤŠVŌŸĚthat some contemporary philoso-
phers have attempted to attack (a) instead by arguing for 
its contradictory counterpart, (c): 
(c) -( K> B ). 
These attempts to demonstrate (c) have been labeled 
counterexamples since they consist of examples Or arguments 
which eventually lead to the contradiction of (a). The way 
in which (c) is generally arrived at is through another sta-
tement: 
(c1) (l{.-B). 
Notice that (cl) is logically equivalent to (c). The slogan 
which is attached to these claims as exemplified by (cl) is 
knowledge without belief. By demonstrating cases wherein an 
individual knows that P, and at the same time fails to believe 
that P, (cl) is acheived. In turn, deductive reasoning evol-
ves (cl) into, (c), and the entailment thesis is contradicted. 
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Of course, providing a counterexample which is capa-
ble of satisfying the defenders of the entailment thesis is 
much easier postulated than performed. Whether or not such 
a counterexample can or does succeed depends heavily on whe-
ther or when one one is willing to grant that, in fact, S 
knows that P. Here, the ground becomes shaky, and perhaps 
even faulty on certain Occasions. After all, the contro-
versy over whether or not one should accept the entailment 
thesis is actually no more than one component of a larger 
controversy -- the question, what is knowledge? If, in or-
der to decide whether or not knowledge implies belief, we 
are firstly required to decide whether or not a given indi-
vidual actually has certain knowledge, must we not rightly 
ŮŬŸŤVVWUŤĚanswer to the question we seek before we ask it? 
We are, then, well advised to keep this question close at 
hand when such questions as we examine draw upon the above 
distinction. Surely neither I nor anyone else desires to 
see the question begged in this manner. 
Let us now proceed to the counterexamples, and the 
objections and ȘŬŸŲŤẄŠÜŮŨŤVĚthey give rise to. 
SECTION 3 
The most famous counterexample of the ental1ment 
thesis has been submltted by Calin Radford. 1 Radford's 
example is stl11 .. a topic of controversy, the 0 bj ect of 
which lnvolves a bet between Jean and Tom. In thls example 
Tom questlons Jean as to certaln dates in English hlstory. 
Jean protests at first say1ng that he does not "know" any 
Engllsh h1story. Nonetheless, Tom persists and the quiz 
gets underway. 
All in all Jean does not falr too badly consldering 
his earller statement of belief concerning what he thinks he 
does not know. To be sure, Jean answers more quest10ns 1n-
correctly than correctly, but he does show a certaln consis-
tency ln correctly answerlng those questions concerning cer-
ta1n dates of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs. For instance, 
he correctly answers that NŨŸŠŞŤWUĚI died in 1603, and that 
JamesI (of England) dled ln 1625. 
Jean's cons1stency ln correctly replying to these 
questions leads both Jean and Tom to doubt that Jean lacked 
knowledge ln th1s area. In fact, they concluded that Jean 
must have at one time learned these dates, and that he must 
have simply forgotten that he had. From th1s example Rad-
ford concludes that "at some stage he (Jean) must have learn-
ed that James I dled in 1625, etc. He did not get these an-
swers right by mere fluke or chance (a possibility they did 
lColin Radford, "Knowledge - by examples", Analysis 
27, No.1 (Oxford, 1966) 1-11. 
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not even bother to rule out -- as a result of some mysterious 
intuition) ." Furthermore, since "he remembers some history, 
and hence he knows some history, including, !.:.E.., that P. fl2 
The way in which the example, if sustained, contra-
dicts the entailment thesis is easily seen. Since Jean does 
not believe that he knows that P, it does not necessarily 
follow that he believes, or is even aware, that P. There-
fore, having no reason to believe that P, it is logically pos-
sible that he does not believe that P. Thus, since it is 
possible to know that P and not believe that P (simultaneous-
ly), we can conclude that it is not the case that knowing 
that P entails believing that P. It is of particular im-
portance to note that in order to refute the entailment the-
sis, one must provide an example whereby S both knows that 
P and fails to believe that P in one and the same time. 
Radford's example succeeds in this regard, although with some 
ambiguity. 
However, if we let fiT" stand for the time between 
Jean's response to Tom's question about James· death and 
Tom's confirmation of Jean's correct reply, we can state 
that at T 3ean knows that P and does not believe that P. 
Radford's example of Jean, an alleged case of know-
ledge without belief, illicited a number of replies which 
2 ill1., p. 5. 
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objected to the validity of his example in many different 
ways and on differing grounds as well. We shall consider 
three such objections; those of L. Jonathon Cohen and O.R. 
Jones are to be dealt with in this section, and Keith Le.rer's 
contribution to this discussion is the subject ŸŬĚ the fol-
> lowing sect ion. 
All of Radford's detractors attempt to prove one 
thing -- that Jean does not really know that P. Cohen at-
tempts to accomplish this by distinguishing between long-
and short-term belief. 3 It is Cohen's contention that Rad-
ford's example fails because the criteria for knowing which 
is applied in this case is of long-term knowing, but of 
short-term believing. 
"On the short-term view we may say that the \7-0 0 
examinee did know some time ago that P, 
but did not know that P when the question-
ing began: later, when the questioning 
resumed, he did know that P. On the first 
and third occasions he must have had a 
short-term belief that P, and on the se-
cond not. ff 4 
Cohen's distinction, then divides Jean's period of 
knowledge into three segments: 
(A) the time in Which Jean originally lear-
ned and therefore knew that P, at which 
time he must also hiVe believed that p. 
(B) the time of Jean's memory lapse at which 
time he did not know that P. In this case 
-
3L•J • Cohen, "More about knowing and feeling sure", 
Analysis 27, No.1 (Oxford, 1966) 11-16. 
4 ŸĦHĚp.12. 
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whether or not he believed that P stands 
irrelevant to our question. 
(C) the time of Jean's recovery of the dates 
and his reply that P. At that time if 
Jean knew that P, then he believed it as 
well. 
Cohen's distinction is very helpful here. As we 
stated before, no counterexample succeeds unless we can 
conclude that S knows that P and does not believe that P at 
T (some specific period of time). I have no quarrel as to 
COhen's specification of (A) and (B), or to his observations 
about the relation of knowledge to belief durin!; those 
periods. However, I find Cohen's breakdown of (C) to be 
lacking. 
Cohen assumes that there exists no interval between 
Jean's stating that P and his receiving confirmation of his 
reply. But as Radford pOints out, this need not be the case. 
In fact, there could exist a great deal of time in between 
Jean's reply that P and the quizmaster's confirmation. In 
fact, it is this very period of time in between S's reply 
and the quizmaster's confirmation which we should like to 
designate as "T" when we say that "s knows that P, but does 
not believe that P at T.n Quite contrary to Cohen's asser-
tion, if we take T to be our period of investigation, it is 
quite possible that S would not believe that P. As Radford 
himself puts it: 
" ••• because he (Jean) believes that he is 
just guessing -- and because there:.are .so 
many years in which she (Elizabeth) might 
have died --he may very well be pretty 
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sure that not-P. I.e., he will think it 
highly probable thar-each of his answers 
is incorrect ••• "5 
By specifying the exact time he is concerned with, 
Radford has dealt successfully with Cohen's objection. The 
second of our oblections, offered by Jones, concerns the 
validity of Radford's claim that, in fact, Jean knows that 
P when Jean so replies. 6 It is Jones' view that Radford's 
example is somewhat incomplete. He feels that Radford is 
assuming too much when he assumes that Tom, who in this ex-
ample represents the judgement of English speaking persons, 
would simply accept Jean's correct replies as cases of ŦŤŸĚ
nuine knowledge without doubting or otherwise further ex-
ploring his reply. 
In other words, Jones feels that we would not be 
justified in concluding that S knows that P unless S is wil-
ling to stick by his response. At this point Jones feels that 
he can present a dilemna from which Radford cannot escape 
unharmed. Jones feels that when asked whether or not he 
felt his response to the question about Elizabeth was cor-
rect, Jean would reply in one of the following ways: 
(1) "Yes it is correct. I remember it." 
(2) "No, ••• I doubt it. How about 16051" 
(3) "I don't know. I told you I was only 
guessing." 
5Radford "Knowing but not believing", Analysis 27 (Oxford, 1966-67) p. 140. 
60 •R• Jones, "Knowing and guessing - by examples", 
AnalYSis 32, No. 1 (Oxford, 1971) 19-23. 
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If Jean's response falls along the lines of (1), 
then we do not have a case of unwitting knowledge. In this 
case we would say that S knows that P, and S believes that 
he knows that P; therefore, one would also say that S be-
lieves that P. 
If Jean responds in a manner similar to (2), which 
is to say, if Jean's reply denies his original response and 
fails to uphold it, then he doesn't know that P. When a 
challenge to his response arises, he is willing to change. 
In this case we would conclude that Jean was correct in the 
first place, he did not know that P; he merely guessed. On 
the basis of (1) and (2) we conclude that if Jean affirms 
his response, he knows as well as believes, and if he de-
nies his response, he never knew in the first place. 
By replying akin to (3), Jean would again, as he had 
in (2), admit that he did not really know that P. We would 
then dismiss his correct response as no more than a lucky 
guess, and lucky guesses do not count for knowledge. Jones, 
by utilizing (1) and(2), has presented Radford with a dilem-
na. Furthermore, by accounting for (3) as well, he has ap-
parently covered the space between the horns as well. If 
Jones' remarks stand, the entailment thesis stands along with 
it, as least as far as this example is concerned. Is there 
an exit? 
That there is. Radford's charge is that Jones has 
not covered enough replies in order to conclude that his 
example does not represent knowledge without belief. In 
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fact, Jones alternative replies do not cover the one reply 
that some in Jean's position would ẀWÙŨŸVŤĦİĚ
Firstly, let us grant that in both (2) and (3) 
Jones is correct, but we can easily lay aside both responses. 
Jean answers that P because he remembers it. He would not 
trade P in for another response that he had not remembered; 
in effect, he would stay with his response that P because 
no other date had occured to him. Secondly, even should he 
reply with (3), that would not prove that he did not know, 
only that he did not know that he knew, and that much is ad-
mitted from the outset. It was his amazing consitency that 
convinced us that he knew, and it was his own lack of aware-
ness of his own knowledge that made us curious as to his 
basis as well as beliefs. We can also rule out (1); Jean 
did not know that he knew, and he would be less than honest 
to say so (surely we must assume hone.'y or any example ȚŠÙŨVŸĦĚ
What Jones assumes, and I think wrongly assumes, is 
having repll..ed that P, S would not stick by his reply unless 
he knew that P, and if he did not know he would forfeit it. 
However, consider this response: 
(4) "I'm not sure ••• , but I'll let it stand." 
Here, S has affirmed his stand without proving that he knows 
that he knows. 
Concerning these two objections, I would like to 
7Radford, "On sticking to what I don't believe to be 
the case", Analysis 32, No.5 (Oxford, 1972) 170-73. 
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make the following comment. Both objections prove false, 
but they are nonetheleas:quite plausible objections. As 
it seems to me, one of the chief problems we have associated 
with the Radford example is not that it fails in the light of 
objection, but that it is ambiguous in their regard. Cohen's 
objection points to an ambiguity of time; Radford has, in 
effect, left very little space between Jean's answer and 
Tom's confirmation. The time which we must designate as T, 
then, is less than one second perhaps, a fact that does not 
lend clarity to be sure since such minute periods are dif-
ficult to speak of. Secondly, as Jones' objection so clear-
ly states, Radford has failed to note just how Jean could 
have remained an unwitting knower in the face of further 
pursuit. 
Of course, Radford's replies to these objections, 
as we have noted, demonstrate that he could have avoided 
........... 
these ambiguities, and thus dispelled the sort of objections 
herein covered. For this reason I have taken the liberty of 
formulating an example based on the Radford model which will 
clearly avoid such controversies. 
SECTION 4 
Two objections which have been launched against the 
Radford example are that (1) Jean does not know the dates 
(that p), but merely guesses them, and (2) even should one 
grant Jean's knowledge of these dates, the entailment thesis 
still remains because Jean's knowledge that P and his lack of 
belief that p occupy two different time periods. I have 
given defense to both of these charges, and we have found 
that they do not hold. Nevertheless, I have formulated the 
following example, based primarily on Radford's example, 
with particular attention given to illusidating any ambi-
guities that may exist in this regard, and thereby refuting 
charges (1) and (2). 
Miles is a freshman at State University, and is 
currently enrolled in a course entitled "Introduction to 
Philosophy." For the last two days Professor Pain has lec-
tured on Descartes with particular attention payed to his 
Meditations. However, Miles has not payed one wit of atten-
tion to what Prof. Pain has so brilliantly lectured about, 
nor has he read any of the readings, nor has he had any 
past (or present) contact with the works of Descartes. To 
put it bluntly, it appears that Miles has learned nothing. 
On this particular day Prof. Pain is interested in 
seeing if any of his students can provide him with a three-
step proof representing Descartes' famous proof for his own 
existence. Spotting Miles as he gazes aimlessly out the 
classroom window, Pain calls on Miles, who somewhat shoc-
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kedly turns his attention toward Pain. The good Professor 
then requests that Miles go to the blackboard and write a 
three-step proof of Descartes' own proof. 
Miles replies, "I'm sorry, but I don't know the an-
swer." Nonetheless, Prof. Pain persists and commands Miles 
to comply with his request whether he thinks he knows the 
answer or not. Miles, not wishing to quarrel further, goes 
to the board and writes: 
1. Doubt implies thought. 
2. Thought implies mind. 
3. Mind implies existence. 
Just as Miles is finished the bell rings, and Prof. 
Pain dismisses the class all except Miles. Pain turns 
to Miles and asks, "Is what you have written the correct an-
swer?" 
Miles replies, "I don't know, but I seriously doubt 
1 t. ff 
"Do you believe that th1s is the exact proof I reques-
ted?" queries Pain. 
"No, I th1nk not." replies Miles. 
"Would you like to change it? I mean, is this your 
answer ••• once and for all?" challenges Pain. 
"Yes, sir. I'll let it stand." At this point Pain 
reveals to Miles that his proof 1s correct and goes ahead 
to question him further about his answer. 
On the basis of this example we can now dismiss any 
charges of guessing. Unlike the Radford example of Jean, 
Miles needed to relay not only data, but structure as well. 
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In such a case a wild guess can safely be ruled out of the 
picture. Furthermore. when challenged, Miles remained with 
his original response. But how did he know? Well, the suc-
cess of the example does not in any way depend on our ability 
to respond to such a question, but perhaps Miles, by simply 
sitting in class, absorbed the information eventhough he 
himself failed to realize it. 
Also, within this example we have provided a clear 
amount of time in which Miles, having already written his 
response, denies his belief in it. What is more, supposing 
that his replies to Pain are honest . (as we said earlier, 
an assumption necessary in any example). we can safely con-
clude that at T (any specific time between Miles' work on the 
blackboard and Pain's informing him of his correct response), 
Miles knows that P and does not believe that P. 
In another sense our counter-example has cleared-
up another of the ambiguities of the Radford example. D.M. 
Armstrong 1 has argued that Radford's example of alleged 
knowledge without belief fails because of the possibility 
of holding contradictory beliefs. That is, even if one as-
sumes that, in a case such as the Radford example, 8 knows 
that P, and that 8 believes that not-p, it still does not 
follow that it is ŪŸWUŤĚcase that 8 believes that P. Bs-p 
(8' believes that not-P), then, does not entail that -Bsp 
l D•M• Armstrong, "Does Knowledge Entail Belief?", 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, (October 1969). 
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(not: S believes that p) because people can, and do, hold 
contradictory beliefs. That is, it is quite possible that 
Bs-p and Bsp could occur at one and the same time. 
Radford objects that in order to reason as such, one 
must beg the question. 2 That is, the Radford example be-
gins with a case of non-belief, and then goes ahead to show 
knowledge (Ksp), although it may be unwitting knowledge. If, 
as Radford charges Armstrong, one assumes that each case of 
unwitting knowledge entails unconscious belief (an undemon-
strable accusat10n since one need not act on one's be11efs), 
then one changes the example. Clearly, 1n order to formu-
late an example of knowledge without belief, one must e1ther 
start w1th Ksp and go ahead to show that -Bsp, or one must 
start with -Bsp and go ahead to show that Ksp. Radford has 
chosen the latter. Thus, if one dogmatically asserts that 
for every case of Kspt there follows some sense of Bsp, 
eventhough unconsc1ous and thereby undemonstrable, one fails 
to allow the very question, can one know and not believe, to 
ever come into question. 
We stated earlier that our example was clearer than 
Radford's in this regard, and so it is. In the Radford exam-
ple it is not clear whether he means -Bsp or Bs-p. If one 
can draw Bs-p from his example, then one might be able to 
raise the sort of serious object1ons ak1n to the sort Arm-
2Radford, "Does unwitt1n knowledge entail un-
consc1ous belief?", Analysis 30 foxford, January 1970) 
103-7. 
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strong has attempted. However, our example clearly has 
Miles in a situation of epistemic neutrality as regards 
belief. It is not the case that Bs-p, nelther is it the case 
that Bsp. Rather, it is simply a case of -Bsp. Thus, Ksp 
and -Bsp. 
SECTION 5 
The Radford example received replies from many sides. 
We have saved the objections of Keith Lehrer! though, for 
a section to itself because he not only proposes to refute 
the Radford example, but offers a proof that knowledge ŸĚ
entail belief as well, a new aspect of our discussion. Leh-
rer schematically summarizes Radford's argument as such: 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Jean knows the correct answer to the 
question. 
The correct answer to the question is 
that Elizabeth died in 1603. 
If Jean knows the correct answer to the 
question and the correct answer to 
the question is that Elizabeth died 
in 1603, then Jean knows that Eliza-
beth died in 1603. 
Jean knows that Elizabeth died in 1603. 2 
Lehrer also formulates the opposing argument which 
he schematizes as follows: 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Jean does not know that his answer 
is correct. 
Jean's answer is that Elizabeth died 
in 1603. 
If Jean does not know that his an-
swer is correct and Jean's answer is 
that Elizabeth died in 1603, then 
Jean does not know that Elizabeth 
died in 1603. 
Jean does not know that Elizabeth 
died in 1603.3 
Lehrer contends that " ••• the two arguments are equal-
ly persuasive, and, moreover, there is no equivocation in the 
word 'know' in the conclusions of these arguments to lessen 
1Keith Lehrer, "Belief and Knowledge", The Philo-
sophical Review LXXVII, (October 1968) 491-99. 
2 illS., p. 495. 
3illS. 
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the force of thecontradiction.,,4 Thus, the only way Lehrer 
can hold that his proof in favor of the entailment thesis 
is correct in stating that Jean does not know that P is to 
reject at least one of the premises of the Radford argument. 
He thusly rejects premise (3) of the first argument. 
Lehrer firstly reasons that premise (3) of Radford's 
ŠŲŦẀŸŤŪWĚ is false due to the claim that Jean, who did not 
believe that he knew the answer, merely guessed at it. A 
correct guess, he contends, does not count as knowledge. In 
order to bolster his claim, Lehrer formulates the example of 
George, a participant in a quiz show. George is asked the 
same question that was put to Jean regarding the date of 
Elizabeth's death. In exchange for the correct response, he 
is offered an automobile. When asked the question, George 
replies, "1603." He answers correctly, thus he drives away 
in a new car. 
In short, Lehrer claims that George did not ŸĚ
the answer; he merely replied, and his reply was a guess. 
Lehrer, then, draws a distinction between answering correc-
tly and knowing the correct answer. A lucky guess that P 
does not constitute an instance of knowing that P. (We shall 
not at this point argue against Lehrer's objection. We 
shall instead do so in the next section.) 
Lehrer does not stop here though. Having offered 
an argument of refutation versus Radford, Lehrer goes ahead 
4 1£11., pp. 495-96. 
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to offer a proof that he feels demonstrates that knowledge 
implies belief. The argument that follows is Lehrer's own 
schematization. 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(4 ) 
If S does not believe that P, then 
S does not believe that he knows that 
P. 
If S does not believe that he knows 
that P, then, eventhough S correctly 
says that P, and knows that he has 
said that P, S does not know that he 
has correctly said that P. 
If, eventhough S correctly says that 
P, and knows that he has correctly 
said that P,(then)S does not know 
that he has correctly said that P, 
then S does not know that P. 
If S does not know that P, then S 
does not believe that P. 5 
When (4), Lehrer's conclusion, is exposed to the 
logical rule of implication, it reads: 
(5) If S knows that P, then S believes that P. 
If we add the component of time (at T), this statement 
is the exact expression of the entailment thesis. 
5Ibld., p. 498. 
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SECTION 6 
Lehrer's reply to Radford's example is of particular 
interest since he not only presents a case which purports 
to disable this one example, but goes ahead to utilize the 
basis for his criticizm in order to construct a proof which, 
if sound, would secure the entailment thesis from further 
attack. Of course, philosophers do not desert their res-
pective positions without firstly taking great pains to keep 
them. It is no surprise, then, that not everyone became de-
fenders of the entailment thesis as a result of Lehrer's 
remarks. 
The key point of Lehrer's objection, as well as his 
subsequent proof, is that if S does not know that P is cor-
rect when S states that P, then S does not know that P. In 
other words, Lehrer is contending that because Jean does not 
know that he is correctly stating that P when he in fact does 
so, he therefore fails to know that P. Radford, however, 
obj ects to Lehrer's "twist" of his argument. Lehrer, due 
to his requirement of believing that one knows that P, fol-
lows then by assuming that Jean must be guessing. 
To the contrary, Radford holds that Jean's only 
mistake is in believing that he is guessing. Jean does, 
like Lehrer, believe that he is guessing, and because of the 
overwhelming odds against him, he also fails to believe that 
P. 
Granted, should we isolate only one of Jean's an-
swers, say his answer to the question about Elizabeth, there 
would be no means of detecting whether or not Jean was gues-
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sing at the answers. We might, though, be very inclined to 
say that he was. It is, though, not merely his correct an-
swers, but more precisely his amazing consistency in correc-
tly reply1ng to a certain set of quest10ns wh1ch bolsters 
our cla1m that Jean does know that P. This p01:c.t, his con-
sistency, most detractors do not wish to be bothered w1th. 
Aga1n, though, we must turn away from Radford's 
example for the moment and look elsewhere for a reply to Leh-
rer. In order to do so, we shall sight an example d1rected 
aga1nst the thes1s that 1f S knows that P, then S knows that 
he knows that P. E.J. Lemmon1 writes of Alan, a man who 
claims to have forgotten much of what he 1 earn eli about mathe-
mat1cs. PŸŤŪĚasked the expans10n of R1 to four dec1mals, 
Alan rep11es that he does not know. He, then, :3uddenly re-
members and says, "Yes I do, 1t 1s 3.1416." To make the exam-
ple even more so11d, Alan m1ght even go on to give the ex-
pansion of R1 to ten dec1mals, 3.1415926536 (a suggestion 
made by Lehrer h1mself). 2 
What we have, then, 1s an example wh1ch refutes 
both prem1ses (2) and (3) of Lehrer's argument. Certa1nly 
for the sake of consistency one who argues that knowledge im-
plies belief would likew1se be obligated to affirm that if S 
knows that he knows that P, then S believes that he knows as 
1 E.J. Lemmon, "If I 
E 1stemolo : New Essa s 1n 
York: Harper and Row, 9 7 
Know that I Know?", 
of Knowled e, (New 
2 Lehrer, Knowledge, 2£. £11., p.61. 
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well. Lemmon's example thus refutes (2). Likewise, premise 
(3), which directly entails that S must know that he knows 
in order to know, is done in as well. Of course, along with 
primtses (2) and (3) falls Lehrer's entire proof of the 
entailment thesis. 
We might also revert for a moment to the example 
of our own which we presented in Section 4. In this ease 
the answer which Miles writes on the board is far too com-
plicated to involve a guess. Yet, he knows and he sticks by 
(defends) his claim. He does not, though, know that he knows. 
At this point the arguments for and against the entail-
ment thesis can become either mind-boggling or meaningless. 
Lehrer contends that this confusion is due to wham he likes 
to call tlborderline cases of knowledge.,,3 To wit, Lehrer 
points out that the central issue which surrounds all exam-
ples aimed against the entailment thesis is whether or not 
the subject does at some time in fact know that P. Lehrer's 
point here is well taken, and should not go unnoticed. In 
effect, it deals with the point we made earlier about the 
danger involving begging the question in terms of defining 
knowledge. To be sure, the major question which precludes 
any debate about the entailment thesis is, what is know-
ledge? If, in order to settle a particular dispute within 
epistemology, in this case the question of entailment, we 
must firstly decide whether or not S does know that P, then 
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in some sense the larger question has to be begged. 
Furthermore, the controversy which surrounds these 
"borderline cases" is so great, and the arguments of each 
side so equally balanced, that any general agreement as to 
whether or not one of these cases actually constitutes a 
state of knowledge in its subject seems out of the question. 
Thus, Lehrer fe.e1.s that we should, in the course of our dis-
cussions, confine ourselves to cases where there can be 
reached a general agreement as to the subject's epistemic 
state. 
The problems with this sort of requirement, though, 
are two in number. Firstly, what is to constitute general 
ŠŦŲŤŤÜŤŪWŸĚ As all students of epistemology must at some 
point come to realize, there exists an epistemological po-
Sition, respectable in many circles throughout the ages, 
which is known as "skepticism." The skeptics, because they 
hold that no cases of knowledge eXist, or in some more strin-
gent cases they hold that a case of knowledge is impossible. 
Thus, they would not be willing to grant anytime that S knows 
that P in any case one might wish to examine. In order to 
attain any general agreement of sorts, ÖŸMȚŤVVŬŲĚwould have 
to be willing to exclude the skeptics from such a discussion 
as well. (This is not to say that Prof. Lehrer would be wil-
ling to exclude the skeptics. Lehrer himself, at certain 
points, has defended a skeptical viewpoint. We only mean 
to say that in order to accomplish what has been suggested, 
excluding extremist Viewpoints becomes essential.) 
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We are now led to our second point, one which was 
originally suggested to me by Dr. David Annis:: in the con-
text of conversation. If one wishes to carry out a certain 
investigation, one must at times be willing to disregard the 
extremes and procede in the most general way possible. How-
ever, if cases of the extreme circumstances begin to crop 
up with some degree of regularity, one must re-examine one's 
criteria for deciding what is, in fact, a general case. When 
investigating an empirical or scientific matter, generali-
zations are far easier determined than in logical matters. 
In matters of science a frequency chart can be prepared be-
forehand so that one might be able to aptly detect that which 
constitutes the mainstream. One can then conclude that for 
m2!l cases, or even for almost !!1 cases, a particular con-
clusion holds. 
In our particular endeavour, though, the actual em-
pirical occurrence of S's knowing that P is undeterminable 
and, what is more, of no significance. What does it mean to 
say that if we rule out "borderline" cases of knowledge and 
disregard skepticism, then knowledge implies belief? Surely, 
that still leaves us to ask whether or not knowledge implies 
belief in all cases, which is to say given the very notion 
of l0gical entailment, whether or not knowledge implies be-
lief at all? 
SECTION 7 
At this point we may have arrived at a stalemate. 
From one point of view we might say that those presenting 
arguments against the entailment thesis have succeeded in 
casting a doubt, or at least a formidable shadow of one, upon 
the entailment thesis. Some of their examples seem to be 
internally consistent and quite damaging. Some, as Radford 
himself argues,l even seem humanly possible, a characteris-
tic not necessarily required of logical counterexamples, 
but certainly to their credit. 
On the other hand, the defenders of entailment do 
not seem willing to budge the tiniest bit. 1ihenever an al-
legal counterexample to their thesis is presented, they re-
turn prepared to refute the subject's claim to knowledge, or 
at least to cast serious doubt about it. Having seen to it 
that S cannot be said to know that P, whether or not S also 
believes that P becomes a matter of not even acedemic im-
portance. Have we reached, then, the proverbial brick wall? 
As we have noted, not even the kind of exit proposed by Leh-
rer, that of confining our discussion to certain "general" 
cases, has proven successful. 
If arguments against the entailment thesis have not 
proven persuasive, we might be inclined to conclude that the 
entailment thesis still holds. After all, it is the duty of 
the challenger to beat, not merely tie, the champion. Like-
Wise, any thesis which hopes to contend with as established 
1Radford, Analysis 32, ŸĦĚ£!l., p.173. 
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a tenant as the entailment thesis must not only bring about 
allegedly "borderline" conflicts of the older theory, but 
must offer a clear and distinct alternative to the relation 
between knowledge and belief as well. If the relation be-
tween knowledge and belief, r.espectively, is not one of lo-
gical implication, then what is it? 
The answer which comes to mind immediatly is that 
if the entailment thesis is proven false, then no relation 
obtains between knowledge and belief, save one of coinci-
dence. It is most likely the case that philosophers have 
worked so diligently in the past, and continue to do so in 
the present in order to save epistemology from this "hor-
rible" fate. Although I personally think that the shock 
of such a discovery would be somehow less than earth-shat-
tering, others have fought such a possible revelation with 
both hands and feet. After all, most theories of knowledge 
somehow involve themselves in belief somewhere along the 
line, and of course the justified true belief definition 
is a prime example. 
In order to appease this bitter conflict, David 
Annis has proposed an explanation of the relation between 
knowledge and belief which in some manner intends to bridge 
the gap. This "alternative account" of the relation bet-
ween knowledge and belief is designed to explain why we 
basically tend to conclude that one who does not believe 
that P, does not know that P, and at the same time provide 
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an account of the extraordinary cases of knowledge which 
counter-entailment philosophers have found so interesting. 2 
Annis begins by listing an account of the evidence 
necessary for knowledge. He states that 1t ••• S's nonbasic 
belief that p3 is epistemically justified if and only if 
there is a set of propositions El, E2, ••• En such that 
(1) For each Ei (i = 1,2, ••• n) S believes 
that E1. 
(2) For each Ei, S is justified in belie-
ving Ei. 
(3) S believes that P on the basis of E1, 
E2, ••• En. 
(4) The set E1, E2, ••• En provides adequate 
support for P. 
(5) There is no other set of propositions 
E'l, E'2, ••• E'n such that S believes 
the elements of the set and the conjunc-
tion of these elements with E1, E2, ••• 
En does not provide adequate support 
for P. 4 
We shall designate this set of requirements the 
condition of adequacy. Of this list it is condtion (3) 
which draws our attention. As Annis sees it, it is If ••• 
a complex condition for which it is difficult to provide 
an analysis. It is intended to ensure that there 1s a 
certain relationship between S's belief in P and his evi-
2David Annis, "Knowledge, Belief, and Rationality", 
The Journal of Philosophy (Vol. LXXIV, No.4, April 1977) 
217-25. 
3Annls uses "h" here, but we shall use 'Ip" for our 
own consistency of reference. 
4 Ann is, 2.E.. ill., p. 21 3 • 
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dence • .,5 For instance, in examing a certain position we 
might conclude that reasons A, B, and 0 constitute good rea-
sons for holding that position. However, S might hold that 
position for completely different reasons, say D, E, and F, 
which are very poor reasons for holding that position; which 
is to say, they fail to provide proper justification for S's 
position. What this comes down to, of course, is that one 
must not only hold the right belief, one must also do so 
for the right reasons, whatever they might be. 
Notice that all along we have talked of holding 
the evidence in support of some belief, and in fact con-
dition (3) entails that S believes that P. As Annis views 
it then, the task is to develope a replacement for condition 
(3), one which performs the necessary function of assuring 
that there exists a relationship between a ŮŬVŸÙŬŪĚand the 
proper evidence for that position, but at the same time, it 
must remain neutral with respect to entailment. 
Oonsider Annis' "counterfactual analogue", 
(3' ) If S were to believe that P, then his 
belief would be based on E1, E2, ••• En. 6 
In Annis' words, "The counterfactual analogue is meant to 
capture the ŸĚepistemic conditions relevant to P as the 
original analysis of justification except for the condition 
of SiS believing(that) P." 7 
5Ibid. 
-
6 ŸĦHĚp.219. 
7llli. 
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Annis provides us with an example of what he means. 
Let us suppose that we have two men, Smith and Jones, who 
are police investigators. While investigating a murder, both 
Smith and Jones uncover certain evidence, El, E2, ••• En, which 
all indicates that Jones' father, Jones, Sr., committed the 
crime. In this case both Smith and Jones, Jr., are in the 
same epistemic position; which is to say, they both are in 
possession of the same evidence, all of which implicates 
Jones, Sr., and all of which is very convincing. According 
to the conditions of adequacy previously listed, both Smith 
and Jones, Jr. know that Jones, Sr. committed the murder (p). 
However, in this particular case, Jones, Jr. fails to believe 
that P. Annis suggests that he does so out of some ethical 
obligation that he feels to his father. But no matter, he 
has the evidence, and he does not believe. 
We are by now quite aware of the usual objection to 
this type of example, and that is that if Jones, Jr. fails 
to believe that P, it is because he does not really know that 
P. Surely he must have some evidence contrary to El, E2, ••• 
En, or some portion thereof, or he must otherwise think the 
evidence to be uncompelling or incomplete in some manner. 
Annis, though, assures us that the evidence is quite compel-
ling as well as complete, and that Jones, Jr. is painfully 
aware of this. FUrthermore, Jones,Jr. has absolutely no 
evidence to the contrary of any evidence implicating his 
father. 
For all intents and purposes it is clear that Jones, 
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Jr. (S) knows that P. Why, then, does he fail to believe 
that P? The answer quite simply is that S fails to believe 
that P because he is irrational. A person is said to be ir-
rational, either in thought or in deed, when he fails to take 
the necessary steps toward a desired goal despite the fact 
that he realizes what the necessary steps are. In this in-
stance the desired goal is finding out who committed the 
murder. Jones, Jr. does find out who did,it, which is to 
say, he knows that P. But because he does not wish to see 
his father punished, perhaps, he fails to take the normally 
ordinary epistemic step of committing himself to believe 
that P. It is, then, Jones, Jr.'s irrationality which pre-
vents him fro'm believing that P, and it is due to his fai-
lure to do so, which we as third parties observe, that we 
say that he is irrational. 
In another example involving a mother and her child, 
the child is hit and killed by an automobile right before 
its mother's eyes. The mother clearly sees the accident, she 
screams in horror upon its occurrence, she runs to the child's 
side. Furthermore, other witnesses at the scene confirm the 
mother's position; she (S) knows that the child is dead (p). 
Yet, she nevertheless fails to believe that P. She fails to 
do so prehaps because to take that epistemic step would be 
psychologically too much for her. At any rate she fails to 
do so because her state of ÜÙŸTĚ is one of irrationality, and 
thus her behavior is irrational as well. 
These examples, following from Annis' proposed amen-
dment of condition (3), provide examples where S knows that 
ĤŸĤ
P, but at the same time S fails to believe that P due to 
SiS irrationality and evidenced by SiS irrational conduct. 
It is precisely because we have assumed rational proceedure 
on behalf of humans that we have likewise felt that if S 
knows that P, then he will believe it as well. We are sur-
prised when an inspector such as Jones, Jr. fails to believe 
something he knows to be the case. We are surprised because 
we as epistemologists, like economists, have assumed that 
people such as inspectors, or just ·plain, ordinary people", 
will behave rationally. However, many have blamed the failure 
of economic theory to consistently predict certain turns 
and trends on the failure of the assumption of rationalty 
to obtain. LikeWise, Annis has noted that the problem of 
borderline cases and their continual defiance of the entail-
ment thesis has resulted from our assumption that the subject 
is in a rational state of mind and is likewise behaving ra-
tionally. In other wordS, when the subject reacts in a man-
ner we deam irrational, which indicates the subject's irra-
tional state of mind, the entailment thesis fails. 
There still remains yet one hurdle left to clear 
before we can effectively state the preceding. That is, 
it might be argued that if S is not rational, then S cannot 
know that P; which is to say, knowledge implies rationality. 
Annis answers this claim by way of example, the idiot sa-
vant. Such persons show amazing consistency in arriving at 
correct solutions to immensely complicated problems by ir-
rational and unexplainable methods. Such behavior, like-
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wise, indicates an irrational state of mind. 
Consider Annis' example of a man who, having no 
formal knowledge of mathematics whatsoever, nevertheless ar-
rives at the correct answers to these problems by running 
around the room, beating his head on the walls, and thus 
producing a trance-like state. During this state his an-
swers to the problems are consistently correct, so much so 
that it would be a very good bet to wager on his being cor-
rect in the future. Yet his method remains irrational, and 
as far as we can tell, incomprehensible. If knowledge im-
plies rationality, then the idiot savant would not be able 
to answer with such accuracy, would he? Thus, if such a 
case is possible, it would be incorrect to say that knowledge 
implies rationality. 
It would also be a mistake to dismiss this example 
on the grounds that idiot savants constitute an empty set, 
bolstered by the claim that examples such as the preceding 
are plainly impossible. In order to dispel this objection, 
one need only refer to Edgar Casey, a man of our own cen-
tury. Casey was known to go into a "trance", and formu-
late the correct answers to questions so complicated that 
even the most advanced minds of that time who dealt profes-
sionally with that particular subject could not arrive at 
some of them until years later. In his normal state, though, 
Casey was virtually illiterate, and thus could not very well 
have been simply a very learned and exceptional man in many 
fields. What is more,he himself could not remember what went 
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on during his trances, and thus he relied on others' reports 
of his own doings. Amazing! 
Others have noted that rationality played a part in 
our defense or attack of the entailment thesis,8 but no one 
before Annis has succeeded in drawing conclusions that have 
proven as damaging to the entailment thesis. Since we can-
not assume that knowledge implies rationality, and since it 
has been demonstrated that the entailment thesis fails to 
hold for cases in which the subject fails to be rational 
but knows nonetheless, (ET) 
(ET) If S knows that P at T, then S believes that 
P at T. 
fails to hold for all cases. On this account it seems 
that the entailment thesis is subject to rejection, and 
unless it is somehow reformulated, it cannot stand. 
8Jonathon Harrison, ŸĦĚ£11., p.332. 
SECTION 8 
As yet no one has attempted to reformulate the en-
tailment thesis in order to meet the specifications layed 
down by Annis. Annis himself thought that he had disproven 
the entailment thesis, and, as it had been traditionally 
defined, I myself can see no other way out for its defenders 
other than to admit to a relationship more complicated than 
mere entailment. However, it is quite possible that the en-
tailment defenders shotadopt for limiting the sphere of the 
entailment thesis. Remember, one of the solutions offered 
by the defenders included limiting the object of our dis-
course to "general", that is, excluding borderline, cases. 
As such, we see no obstacle which could prevent such phi-
losophers ȚŲŬŸĚ seperating rational cases of knowledge from 
irrational cases of knowledge. 
It is clear that the entailment thesis runs into 
difficulty when confronted with cases of irrational know-
ledge, ŸĦHĚthe idiot savant. Even such cases as the Rad-
ford example, and along with it our example modeled on his, 
do not represent clearly rational matters of knowledge. 
After all, when asked on what basis his responses stand, 
Jean would be without reply. Thus, whether or not one is 
willing to conclude that Jean is jU3tlfied in his assertion 
that P iD part depends on whether or not one requires that 
S be able to sight rational reasons in defense of P in the 
light of accusation, or merely have some justification to 
which S stands unwitting. Clearly the latter is Radford's 
position since he contends that Jean remembers, but does not 
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know that he is remembering. However, should one adopt the 
former position, it would be possible to label SIS method of 
knowing irrational since it escapes his own explanatory 
powers. (Radford himself once employed the term "mystical" 
to the way in which Jean and Tom justify Jean's correct re-
sponses, and for many westerners the term "mystical"is vir-
tually o-n-eaud the same with "irrational".) On the other 
hand, even if one ȘŬŪWŤŪTŸĚ that Jean's method is irrational, 
that does not imply that Jean's state of mind is irrational 
as well. Thus, once again we ŤÜŮŸÙYŤĚthat whether or not 
one chooses to accept the Radford example is a matter of 
predisposition more than anything else. 
Thus far we have spoken of the possibility of a re-
formulation of the entailment thesis. But what form would 
such a reformulation take? Clearly, the new form would wish 
to apply itself as the old form did to all cases where S is 
rational. That is to say, if S is rational, then the en-
tailment thesis should follow. 
(ET2) If S is rational at T, then if S knows 
S knows at T, S believes that P at T. 
Let us call (ET2) the rational entailment thesis, or the 
thesis of rational entailment. Suppose we let the following 
symbols stand for(ET2): 
(ET2) 
R: S is rational at T. 
K: S knows that P at T. 
B: S believes that P at T. 
R> (K> B) 
Notice that if we contraposition (ET2) we arrive at: 
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(a) -(K> B) > -R or, 
(b) (K .. -B) > -R. 
Statement (b) above represents a very well put version of 
(ET2) .. In words, if ŸĚknows that P and fails to believe 
that P, then S fails to be rational. Thus, (ET2) aptly 
explains irrational cases of knowledge by failing to con-
sider them. In effect, when we began, the context of our 
discussion was limited only to propositional knowledge. Now 
however, we have seen that the entailment thesis cannot be 
applied to the entire sphere of propositional knowledge; 
rather, it has become necessary to limit it to the sphere of 
propositional knowledge where the subject represents a case 
of rational thought. 
Since all objections to the ontailment thesis have 
thus far been at least partially based on irrational methods, 
it seems that (ET2) has succeeded in escaping from them. Is 
this new formulation beyond reproach then? Hardly. First 
of all, whenever you speak of "rationality", there arises 
some ambiguity. It seems quite easy to say, "That is ir-
rational", "This is rational" or even "That seems (rational) 
irrational." However, is it as easy to set down a specific 
criteria for rationality? 
In effect, a full-blown discussion of the matter 
would take us far outside of our own question, whether or 
not a definition of knowledge ought to include a belief con-
dition, and into a discussion of methods of detecting ra-
tionality in a subject. Actually, we have no intent of 
doing anything of the sort. To be honest, not that much 
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hangs on a precise formulation of rationality where we are 
concerned. Like almost all discussions in philosophy, this 
one too would take us into the fringe areas where we sould 
be required to sort out examples of "borderline" behavior 
and borderline rationality. 
Instead, we shall speak of rationality in the broa-
dest sense possible. Rather than attempt to specify some 
particular system of logic, or some scientific method, we 
shall simply consider any method which fairly evaluates the 
evidence at hand as being rational. On the other :land, 
whenever anyone allows their emotions or dogmas to over-
ride their proper appraisal of the evidence (as did Annis' 
inspector), or whenever anyone procedes in an unexplainable 
or contradictory fashion, we shall designate such behavior 
irrational. In doing so, we feel that we have been more 
than charitable with the defenders of (ET2). By speaking 
of irrationality so broadly, we have ruled out a great 
number of possible cases. Consider the following case. 
A scientist (S) amasses a great deal of information 
which comprises evidence indicating that P. According to 
certain objective standards set down by his discipline, the 
evidence is SUbstantial enough to justify S's claim to know 
that P. Since S himself conducts the experiments, and since 
he himself is fully aware of the standards for knowing set 
down by his diSCipline, and since he is also in full agree-
ment with those standards, it is clear that S knows that p. 
However, because of his personal beliefs, perhaps a religious 
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conviction of some sort, S cannot bring himself to believe 
that P. Of course, S is greatly troubled by such behavior 
on his part. Nevertheless, the evidence is beyond dispute, 
and he admits to knowing this and to knowing that P, but he 
cannot bring himself to believe that P. 
Given the notion of rationality we have offered, 
such a case would show that S was irrational since he allowed 
his dogmatic convictions to stand in the way ŬŸĚhis proper 
appraisal of the evidence. Given this notion of rationality, 
the question is, can any example of knowledge without be-
lief where the subject is also rational be found? We con-
tend that it can, and the following section shall contain 
ÚẀŸWĚ such an example. In keeping with our notion of ration-
ality, our example will involve a case where there exists 
little, if any, room to doubt our subject's rationality. 
SECTION 9 
For quite some time now psychologists and other 
interested parties have been awed by the enormous portion 
of the brain which apparently lies dormant. Within the last 
decade or so, there have been numerous experiments with un-
conscious learning. Whether and how learning relates to 
the domains of the brain is a matter for the psychologists, 
but the implications of unconscious learning, in this case 
at least, form an interesting study for the episemologist 
especially those who stand against the entailment thesis. 
There have been numerous reports of unconscious 
learning floating about. For instance, I once heard of a 
foreign languages instructor who taught her subjects while 
her students leaned back and listened to soft classical music. 
Since the students' attention was focused on the music, they 
ŸÙTĚnot, in many cases, remember having learned any new lan-
guage. When tested, however, they did quite well. Much 
like (.ur own example of Miles, the poor philosophy student, 
such examples involve unwitting absorption of knowledge. Also, 
like our example, such cases are suspect. 
Whether or not one is willing to admit that S knows 
that P, where S has been the subject of a learning process 
akin to the above, is again a matter of disposition. How-
ever, one need not admit that the method of learning em-
ployed was a rational one, or it could be said that due to 
this method, S was induced into an irrational state. If 
either of these examples is correct, no harm can come to 
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the rational entailment thesis in terms of these examples. 
However, if these methods of learning were carried out in 
a scientific manner, that is, if they were to be performed 
in sucha manner as to allow empirical methods of measure-
ment and confirmation to be made possible, and if this me-
thod were substant1ated and exp11aned by a plaus1ble sc1en-
t1fic WUŤŸŲXHĚ then one would be incapable of denying the 
credentials of rat10nality belong1ng to such a method. 
Fortunately, such studies have been done, and their 
results posit1vely substantiate such cla1ms to knowledge. 
In part1cular, there have been stud1es on the ab1lity to 
learn while 1n a state of consciosness that ex1sts between 
waking and sleeping. In th1s "trans1t10nal" state the sub-
ject would answer 1f talked to, but his memory of such 
events would in most cases be neg11g1ble to non-ex1stent. 
Thomas H. Budzynsk1,1 who holds degrees 1n electrical en-
gineering as well as psychology, has developed a biofeed-
back techn1que which allows a person to be trained to rema1n 
1n th1s trans1t10nal state for poss1bly long periods of 
time. During th1s period one can absorb and reta1n a great 
deal of 1nformat10n. Nevertheless, it would not necessar1ly 
be the case that that same person would remember having 
learned anyth1ng in part1cular, or for that matter, anyth1ng 
'T.H. Budzynski, "Tun1ng in on the Twilight State", 
Psychology Today (Vol. 11, No.3, August 1977) 38-44, and 
"Biofeedback and the Twilight States of Consciosness", ed. 
G.E. Schwartz and D. Shap1ro, Consc10usness and Self-Regu-
lat10n, Vol. 1 (Plenam 1976). 
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at all. Let us suppose, then, that S learns that P at T1, 
and let T1 stand for the period of transitional state lear-
ning. It is reasonable to state, then, that S knows that P 
at Tl. However, immediately following T1, let us suppose 
that the instructor awakens S. While S is sitting there, 
having awaken, he need not, and in fact probably would not, 
remember having learned that P. In other words, we have ar-
rived at a familiar claim: that S does not know that he 
knows that P. In this case, though, such a claim is not 
merely logically possible, but it is empirically possible 
as well. 
During the period following T1, S would not be in 
a positmn to believe that P (necessarily). Here, we would 
find a situation not wholly distinct from the Radford exam-
ple. except it is clear in this case that S knows that P. 
Eventhough S has learned that P, S does not know that he 
knows that P. Thus, S could fail to believe that he knows 
that P, and in fact fail to believe that P as well. In 
this case it would be indefensible to claim that S does not 
know that P. S is simply not yet in a position to realize 
that he knows what he does. Oonsider a man who is in a cer-
tain financial pOSition, let us say that he has just in-
herited a sum of money, but he does not yet realize it; 
he nonetheless occupies that position. Similarly, even-
though S does not yet realize his epistemological position 
(knowing that p), he nonetheless occupies it. Thus, S 
knows that P. However, there still exists the logical 
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aD well as empirical possibility (probability?) that S 
should fail to believe that P due to his lack of epistemic 
awareness. Thus, S knows that P and S does not believe that 
P. 
There remains just one more point to be investi-
gated on this matter, the que3tion of rationality. We have 
already touched upon this matter" and an investigation of 
the empirical sources cited will yield justification for 
the following statement. Since S has learned that P, and 
thereby knows that P due to a verifiable scientific pro-
cedure, and since this procedure is explainable in terms 
of the phenomena of brain lateralization, a natural human 
brain function, the method employed is rational. 
Even though, could it be that such a method, while 
itself rationally comprehensible, reduces its subjects to 
an irrational state? While it is true that many functions of 
the brain are overloaded here, the brain still retains 
certain "protective defenses", critical judgement thus 
remaining at least a possibility. This point, though, has 
not yet been fully substantiated. Nevertheless, whether or 
not one admits to this point, that is, whether or not one 
admits to S's rationality at T1, the time of learning, the 
objection stands. 
Clearly, the time at which S knows but does not 
believe need not be Tl. In fact, we should like to desig-
nate it as T2, the time after T1 and before any re-evalua-
tion by S of the subject matter with which P is concerned, 
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that is, before S realizes that he knows. At T2 even 
should S have been irrational during Tl, there can be no 
obstacle to S's rationality. S has learned by a rational 
procedure, at T2 S is rational, at T2 S knows that P, and 
at T2 S does not believe that P. Notice, then, what has 
occured. We have refuted the rational entailment thesis. 
The rational entailment thesis, using the symboli-
zation set down in Section 8, is as follows: 
( ET 2 ) R > (K > B) • 
What we have stated in the preceding paragraph, again sym-
bolized as before, reads: 
( - ET 2 ) R· (K· - B) 
thus: R. - ( -K vB) 
R--(K>B) 
-(-Rv (K > B» 
concl. -(R> (K>B». 
Notice that the conclusion is the exact contradictory 
of (ET2). 
In effect, if our argument is accepted, and we think 
that it is compelling indeed, then (ET2) has failed, and 
we ourselves can see no other obvious alternative for the 
defenders of the belie·f condition at this point. Owing most-
ly to Annis, as well as Radford, we saw that the entail-
ment thesis (ET) could not apply universally. Thus its es-
sence of logical entailment was lost. Now (ET2), even-
though it was limited to rational subjects, has failed as 
well. At this point we have no other choice than to claim 
that on the basis of the evidence presented, knowledge 
fails to imply belief. If in the future a reformulation 
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of the belief condition which can escape our objections 
comes to light, then the matter must be re-opened once more. 
But such a reformulation escapes our powers of anticipation. 
Having accomplished our prime goal, we now pass on to the 
final section in which we shall speculate as to the possi-
bility of a theory of knowledge without a belief condition. 
SECTION 10 
It is our position, and clearly so, that on the basis 
of our evidence the entailment thesis, and the rational en-
tailment thesis as well, have been refuted, or at least 
been put in a position of the utmost dubitability. Many 
philosophers who have defended entailment, have done so at 
least partially because they felt that such a notion was 
essential to any theory of knowledge. If so, the part we 
have played has been one of a "destroyer". While some 
might consider such a role to be void of any positive qua-
lities, that is, without any positive contribution to our 
quest of defining knowledge, we do not agree. Clearly, our 
quest should not be merely to define knowledge, there have 
been countless definitions, and almost anyone can define 
knowledge in some manner. Our quest should primarily be to 
understand what is meant by knowledge, and from this should 
we derive a definition. Thus, if a task such as ours suc-
ceeds in demonstrating that a certain claim is false, then 
such a claim should no longer be made. In our case it should 
no longer be main tained that knowledge implies belief, and 
future theories of knowledge should refrain from using 
belief as a building block for a definition. 
We contend, then, that by eliminating any logical 
connection between belief and knowledge, we have in some 
small manner benefited epistemology. Having discovered 
that such a connection is lacking, future philosophers 
should at least have the advantage of knowing where not to 
lookl And when one considers that so much of epistemology 
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has been headed in this direction, by pointing out that it 
is wrong-headed, one serves to save philosophers a lot of 
time and effort. 
David Annis1 is one of the few philosophers who 
does not feel any special loss-at the passing of the entail-
ment thesis. Annis states that eventhough the belief con-
dition ȚŠÍÍVŸĚwe still have the justification and truth 
conditions, and these two are by themselves sufficient for 
knowledge. However, whether or not knowledge can continue 
to be defined as it is without reference to belief is a 
matter for another discourse, and we cannot rightly say 
at this point. Perhaps W6 must tentatively reject all three 
conditions in favor of an unprejudiced beginning anew. This, 
of course, remains to be seen. 
However, there is one further pOint, or more pro-
perly, possibility that we would like to discuss. We have 
for some time now been interested in a theory of knowledge 
which fails to include belief as one of its ȘŬŪTÙWÙŬŪVŸĚ On 
this account we recall that a Zen Buddhist master2 once di-
vided enlightenment into three topics, practice, attitude, 
and understanding. In his book proper practice, attitude, 
and understanding comprise necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for enlightenment. 
York: 
1Annis , ŸĦĚ£1i., p.225. 
2Shunryu Suzuki, Zen Mind. Besinner's Mind, (New 
John Weatherhill, Inc., 1970). 
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Strangely enough, or not so strangely if you accept 
out thesis, Zen, the traditional higher path to enlighten-
ment, makes no matter about what one believes or ought to 
believe. If we may be so bold as to speculate as to the 
reason for this, it seems that Zen is able to disregard be-
lief for two reasons. (1) Zen is essentially grounded in 
its practice; understanding and attitude, while they are 
conditions of enlightenment, follow eventually from proper 
practice. (2) Long ago the Buddhists realized what only a 
handful of philosophers admit today,that arriving at full 
justification, and thus an assurance of certainty, is im-
possible. 
While all of this may sound far removed from the 
analytic approach of the bulk of our thesis, it still holds 
some common ground. After all, we are now speculating as 
to the possibility of a western system of epistemology which 
holds belief to be coincidence, and not necessity where know-
ledge is concerned. Certainly if (1) and (2) above are cha-
racteristics of such a system, our attention as westerners 
ought to be directed toward the more pragmatic systems and 
theories. When we spoke briefly about pragmatism in Section 
1, we noted that two essential characteristics of knowledge 
were action and evaluation. Clearly without too much trou-
ble one could find distinct parallels between action and 
practice, and evaluation and understanding. Furthermore, 
we are reminded that Charles L. Stevenson, himself a noted 
pragmatist, introduced the notion of attitude as a term 
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applicable to states we might ordinarily term belief. 3 
Of course, such comparisons do not in any way prove that 
pragmatism is identical with Zen, ŬŸĚthat pragmatism is a 
western version of Zen, and we do not intend them to since 
they are obviously distinct. However, it does seem rea-
sonable to assert that it would be possible to attempt to 
construct a plausible theory of knowledge which holds be-
lief to be a matter of mere coincidence using a pragmatic 
approach. 
Enough of this though. We have no more to say 
about the entailment thesiS, and any more speculation of 
the sort we have engaged in would certainly be unwarranted. 
This last section has been included merely to serve as a 
guide to the possibility of epistemology without the en-
tailment thesis. Perhaps some time in the future we shall 
find this to be a subject worth investigating. 
Haven: 
3Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, (New 
Yale Univ. Press, 1944). 
-66-
Stevenson, Charles L. Ethics and Language (New Haven: 
Yale Univ. Press 1944). 
SuzUki, Shunryu Zen Mind. Beginnerrs Mind (New York: 
John Weatherhill, Inc. 1970). 
Vendler, Zeno Res Co nitans: an essa in rational 
chology Cornell Univ. Press 1972 • 
